| Course | DDBA 8531 Seminar in B2B Marketing |
|---|---|
| Week | Week 9 |
| Paper type | Literature appraisal |
| Length | About 850 words, 6 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Walden University |
| Program | Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) |
| Updated | October 2026 |
Free sample paper for DDBA 8531 Week 9
What Long Supplier Relationships Add Beyond the Contract: An Appraisal of Relationship and Governance Research Arguing That Ties Matter Most When Something Happens the Contract Did Not Foresee
Student Name
Walden University
DDBA 8531: Seminar in B2B Marketing
Instructor Name
Month Day, Year
What Long Supplier Relationships Add Beyond the Contract: An Appraisal of Relationship and Governance Research Arguing That Ties Matter Most When Something Happens the Contract Did Not Foresee
The Question and the Answer
Business marketing texts praise long supplier relationships as a source of value, but they rarely say what relationships do that a well-written contract cannot. This appraisal argues that the evidence supports a narrow claim: relationships add most when events occur that the contract did not anticipate, and they work best alongside contracts rather than in place of them.
The Relationship Camp
Morgan and Hunt (1994) proposed that commitment and trust are central to successful relational exchange. Their model treats two mediating variables as central: believing a partner is dependable and honest, and wanting the tie to last, and it links both to more cooperation, more willingness to go along with a partner's requests and less inclination to walk away. They tested the model with survey data from automobile tire retailers. Dwyer et al. (1987) traced how a buyer and a seller move by stages from first noticing each other, through trial dealings and a widening of business, into lasting mutual commitment, laying down norms at each stage that shape what follows.
Both accounts treat the relationship itself as an asset. Palmatier et al. (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of relationship marketing research and found that relational constructs such as trust and commitment were associated with objective performance outcomes, though the effects were stronger for outcomes reported by the parties themselves and varied by context, including whether the relationship was between businesses or with consumers.
The Governance Camp
Williamson (1985) approached the same exchanges from transaction cost economics. On his account, parties who make investments specific to one relationship expose themselves to opportunism, a partner's self-interested behavior including deception, and they protect themselves through governance: detailed contracts, hostages, or bringing the activity inside the firm. Trust plays little role in his framework; safeguards do the work.
A Challenge From the Field
Macaulay (1963) interviewed businesspeople and lawyers in Wisconsin and found that firms frequently did not plan their exchanges in detail, did not rely on contract terms to settle disputes and preferred to resolve problems through negotiation that preserved the relationship. Going to court, as his respondents described it, was a way of ending a business relationship rather than managing one. Macaulay's observations challenge the governance assumption that contracts are the main safeguard, but they also show that contracts existed and were used when relationships failed. His evidence suggests the two operate together.
The Complement Position
Poppo and Zenger (2002), examining how firms buy outsourced information services, reported that detailed contracts and relational norms tended to rise together and reinforce each other instead of one replacing the other. Firms with more complex contracts also showed more relational governance, and the combination was associated with better exchange performance than either alone. Their interpretation was that contracts set out terms and promote cooperation by clarifying expectations, while relational norms help parties adapt where the contract is incomplete.
What the Evidence Can Show
Most of this research relies on surveys of one party in an exchange, often a single informant, measuring trust, commitment and performance at the same time. That design cannot establish that trust causes performance; satisfied partners may simply report more trust. Palmatier et al. (2006) noted the stronger links for self-reported outcomes, which is consistent with that concern. Macaulay's interviews are rich but not systematic. Poppo and Zenger's complement finding is more persuasive because it compares governance forms, but it too relies on survey measures from one side.
The Position
The evidence does not support the broad claim that relationships are good. It supports a narrower one: long ties matter most where contracts are incomplete, when unforeseen events require adaptation. A supplier whose plant floods, a customer whose product is recalled, a regulation that changes specifications midway through a contract: these are the moments when relational norms let parties adjust without renegotiating everything, and when Macaulay's businesspeople chose negotiation over litigation. Poppo and Zenger's evidence that contracts and relationships work together supports this view: contracts handle what can be foreseen, relationships what cannot.
An Objection
A defender of the relationship camp might answer that trust also lowers the cost of ordinary exchange, not only of adaptation, since partners who trust each other spend less on monitoring. That is plausible, and Morgan and Hunt's model implies it. But the evidence for it rests on the same single-informant surveys, and the monitoring savings are rarely measured directly. The narrower claim remains the better supported one.
Implications for Practice
A supplier should not invest in relationships as a substitute for clear contracts. It should write contracts that specify what can be specified and build relationships for the rest, especially in exchanges with high uncertainty and specific investments. Managers can test the claim in their own accounts by asking which relationships helped during a disruption and which did not.
Limits
The appraisal covers a small set of influential studies. It does not review research on relationships in specific industries or cultures, where findings may differ.
References
Dwyer, F. R., Schurr, P. H., & Oh, S. (1987). Developing buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing, 51(2), 11-27. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224298705100202
Macaulay, S. (1963). Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. American Sociological Review, 28(1), 55-67. https://doi.org/10.2307/2090458
Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 20-38. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224299405800302
Palmatier, R. W., Dant, R. P., Grewal, D., & Evans, K. R. (2006). Factors influencing the effectiveness of relationship marketing: A meta-analysis. Journal of Marketing, 70(4), 136-153. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.70.4.136
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707-725. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.249
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. Free Press.
The Walden DDBA 8531 Week 9 instructions
Week 9 asks you to appraise a body of research and take a position. State the question and your answer in the opening paragraph. Organize the review by position rather than by author, presenting each camp's main claims and evidence. Place sources that challenge both sides where they fit. Discuss what the evidence can and cannot show, attending to research design, especially single-informant surveys. Take a position narrow enough to defend with the evidence reviewed, answer the strongest objection and draw implications for practice. End by noting what the appraisal does not cover. Give enough detail about each study's sample and method that a reader could judge its weight without looking it up.
How this DDBA 8531 Week 9 example is built
The sample's relationship section summarizes trust and commitment as drivers of cooperation and lower propensity to leave, tested on tire retailers, and the phases from awareness to commitment. The governance section explains specific investments, opportunism and safeguards. Macaulay's finding that firms often settle disputes without their contracts is placed between the camps, and Poppo and Zenger's information services evidence anchors the complement view. A methods section notes that surveys measuring trust and performance together cannot show causation. The position names floods, recalls and regulatory changes as the moments relational norms matter, and an objection about monitoring costs is answered. An implications section advises writing contracts for what can be foreseen and building relationships for the rest.
Reading the DDBA 8531 Week 9 rubric
Organization by position carries the most weight; summarizing authors in sequence reports sources without appraising them. Faculty read the evidence discussion closely, rewarding attention to what survey measures of trust can and cannot show. Macaulay earns credit when used to challenge an assumption rather than as historical color. Doctoral credit concentrates in the position: a claim narrow enough to defend and supported by the evidence reviewed. Answering an objection fairly shows maturity. Practical implications should follow from the position and suggest how a manager could test it in their own accounts. Accurate representation of each source, including its sample and setting, is expected. Writing should be economical and clearly organized under headings that name positions.
Common DDBA 8531 Week 9 mistakes, and how to avoid them
Read the major sources before deciding your position; many students choose a side first and then cherry-pick. Sort sources into camps on a single page, noting each one's evidence and design. Ask what kind of data each study used and who reported it. A narrow, defensible claim is better than a broad one you cannot support. Look for evidence that both sides can be partly right, as complement research suggests. Keep summaries short so the appraisal has room for evaluation. When drawing implications, think about situations in your own work where a relationship mattered more than a contract. Ask a colleague to read your position statement alone and say what evidence would change their mind about it.
Get a DDBA 8531 Week 9 example written to your instructions
Share the Week 9 appraisal prompt and rubric and the readings your section assigned, if any. An appraisal organized by position, with an evidence discussion, a narrow defended claim and stated limits, is drafted in 24 to 48 hours, free on a first request. It argues its own reading of the literature, so the position in your paper remains yours to take.
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DDBA 8531 Week 9 questions, answered
Where can I find a free DDBA 8531 Week 9 sample paper?
The contracts-versus-relationships appraisal is reproduced whole in the sample section, free to any reader.
What question does the DDBA 8531 Week 9 appraisal address?
What long supplier relationships add beyond the written terms of a contract.
What did Poppo and Zenger find?
Formal contracts and relational governance worked as complements, with the combination linked to better performance.
Why is much of the evidence limited?
It relies on single-informant surveys measuring trust and performance at the same time, which cannot show causation.
What position does the appraisal take?
Relationships add most when unforeseen events require adaptation, and they work best alongside clear contracts.