HLTH 6771 Week 5 Information Sharing Audit Example

Where the Information Chain Thins: An Audit of Threat Information Sharing From the Fusion Center to County Health and Emergency Management

Student Name

Walden University

HLTH 6771: Terrorism: A Systematic Approach for Emergency Preparedness

Instructor Name

Month Day, Year

Where the Information Chain Thins: An Audit of Threat Information Sharing From the Fusion Center to County Health and Emergency Management

The Chain Being Audited

This audit follows one chain of information sharing in the course's composite metropolitan county: threat information that moves from federal and state sources through the state fusion center to local agencies that would need it to prepare for or respond to an act of terrorism. The question is which bodies are obligated to share what with whom, under which instrument, and where the published record shows the connection thinning. The audit works from statutes, the state's fusion center charter, county agreements and the county emergency operations plan. Where an obligation exists only in practice and not in writing, the audit reports it as undocumented.

The Instruments That Create Obligations

Four kinds of instruments govern the chain. Federal law establishes a program within the Department of Homeland Security to support state and regional fusion centers and to assign federal personnel to them (6 U.S.C. § 124h). National prevention guidance describes intelligence and information sharing as a core capability for preventing imminent terrorist threats and stresses sharing with partners who need the information to act (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016). The state's fusion center charter, a composite document for this course, lists its partner agencies and the products it produces. And county documents, agreements and the emergency operations plan, define what local agencies receive and do with information. Each link in the chain depends on one of these instruments.

Link 1: Federal and State Sources to the Fusion Center

The first link is the strongest. Federal personnel assigned to the fusion center and the center's own analysts receive federal threat reporting, and the charter obligates the center to analyze and disseminate information relevant to the state. The statute, the charter and federal agreements all document this link. Nothing in the record suggests it thins, and the center's published annual report describes regular federal briefings to its analysts.

Link 2: Fusion Center to Local Law Enforcement

The charter lists local law enforcement agencies as primary partners and provides for liaison officers. Locally, a part-time deputy from the sheriff's office serves as liaison, receiving the center's bulletins and attends its briefings. An agreement between the sheriff's office and the center, filed with the county board, documents the liaison's access and confidentiality obligations. The link exists in writing, signed by both parties. It is narrower than the capability requires only in staffing: a part-time liaison may not be available when time-sensitive information arrives.

Link 3: Local Law Enforcement to Health and Emergency Management

This is where the chain thins. No document obligates the sheriff's liaison to pass information to the county health department or the emergency management office, and no document defines what they should receive. The charter lists public health as a partner discipline but does not include the county health department among its distribution lists, and the county has no agreement with the center. The emergency operations plan assigns intelligence functions to the sheriff's office and is silent on onward sharing. In practice, the emergency manager reports receiving occasional calls from the liaison, but there is no procedure, no clearance arrangement for health and emergency management staff and no record of what has been shared.

Link 4: Health Information Back to the Fusion Center

The chain should also run the other way. Health departments detect unusual patterns of illness that could signal a biological or chemical attack, and hospitals see unusual injuries. The audit found no instrument requiring or enabling the county health department to report such patterns to the fusion center. The state's disease reporting rules require reporting to the state health department, which has its own relationship with the center, but the county record does not show how or whether that information reaches the analysts who would connect it to other threat reporting.

The Seams in Summary

Table 1 summarizes the chain.

Table 1

Information Sharing Chain and Its Instruments (Composite County)

Why the Seams Matter

The seams sit exactly where preparedness for a terrorism incident depends on information. A credible threat to a public event would require the health department and hospitals to plan for surge and the emergency manager to prepare warnings and shelters. If those agencies learn of the threat late, or not at all, their preparation starts at the moment of attack. Incident management guidance treats information management as a system-wide function that depends on agreed processes among partners (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017). The county has those processes for law enforcement and not for the agencies that would carry the medical and public safety consequences.

What Would Close the Seams

Three instruments would close the seams. A written procedure, adopted by the sheriff's office and the emergency operations center, would define what threat information the liaison passes to health and emergency management and within what time. An agreement between the county health department and the fusion center would place the department on the center's distribution list for products relevant to public health and define how the department reports unusual illness patterns. And an arrangement for a small number of health and emergency management staff to hold the access needed to receive sensitive information would let the information be shared without being stripped of what makes it useful. Each would turn an informal call into a documented link. None would require new money beyond staff time, and each could be tested in the county's next exercise by sending a simulated threat bulletin through the chain and recording when, and whether, it reached the health officer and the emergency manager.

References

Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, 6 U.S.C. § 124h (2023).

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2017). National Incident Management System (3rd ed.).

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2016). National prevention framework (2nd ed.).